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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was to implement tools to reliably monitor and 
analyze incoming Part 810 General Authorization Requests for various nuclear 
technologies.  Texas A&M has utilized and tested the following tools to do so: Excel, 
Tableau, Apriori and Paterva’s Maltego.  
Received requests were converted into a searchable format and tagged such that 
they could be entered into a central repository to enable ad hoc searching. Other 
exploratory goals are as follows: reporting, analyzing, and predicting when a general 
authorization request is to be expected. Reporting requirements have been established 
using the visual analytics software, Tableau, wherein general authorization trends were 
determined and can be monitored. Prediction has been carried out using Tableau’s 
forecast option, which will anticipate the number of general authorizations to be 
received by a given country based on prior requests. The Apriori algorithm was also 
used for prediction purposes. Excel modeling was similarly explored, and it was 
determined that it should be used sparingly, as unknown variables, such as country and 
policy needs, are not taken into consideration. Maltego software has been implemented 
to search the internet and determine when a general authorization report is not received 
based upon news reports.  
Supplementary questions posed by the Department of Energy were explored and 
answered. A statistical analysis conducted using Tableau, revealed that certain U.S. 
companies favor specific foreign entities; meaning the U.S. company of interest has 
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significantly more nuclear technology transfers to one foreign company over others. It 
was further discovered that China has undergone the General Authorization Process 
when it is not a specifically authorized destination. Any country not destined as 
specifically authorized should undergo the specific authorization process; it is not known 
why this is not already in place. Moreover, certain countries that exceed several general 
authorizations per year should be monitored to ensure that general authorizations are not 
being used to circumvent the specific authorization process. The general authorization 
threshold should be determined by the National Nuclear Security Administration.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE 
 
I.A Background 
 
The Part 810 General Authorization Process is the process set forth by the United 
States Government in 10 Code of Federal Regulations Export Control (CFR) Part 810. It 
is important to distinguish between the General Authorization Process and Specific 
Authorization Process, as countries that undergo the Specific Authorization Process 
should not be found requesting nuclear technologies, through the General Authorization 
Process. Unlike General Authorization, Specific Authorization under the authority of 
section 57.b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that for any nuclear material or 
technology wherein, the persons may engage, directly or indirectly, in the production or 
development of special nuclear material outside the United States the Secretary of 
Energy with concurrence of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce must 
approve the request1. This provision applies to technology transfers and technical 
assistance to all activities of the nuclear fuel-cycle, including non-power reactors1. 
Alternatively, General Authorization implements AEA § 57 b.(2), wherein the Secretary 
grants a general authorization for certain categories of nuclear technologies or materials 
that are not considered threatening to the interests of the United States. This also 
includes transfers to specifically authorized destinations given in Appendix A of 10 CFR 
Part 8101, which is presented in Appendix I of this thesis. In the case a state, foreign or 
domestic, desires a nuclear transfer of any sort from the United States, an authorization 
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letter must be sent to the Department of Energy (DOE). The following information is 
required:  
 
A. Name, address, and citizenship of the applicant, and complete disclosure of all 
real parties in interest; if the applicant is a corporation or other legal entity, 
where it is incorporated or organized, the location of its principal office, and the 
degree of any control or ownership by any foreign person or entity2. 
B. A complete description of the proposed activity, including its approximate 
monetary value, the name and location of any facility or project involved, the 
name and address of the person or legal entity for which the activity is to be 
performed, and a detailed description of any specific project to which the 
activity relates2. 
C. Any information the applicant may wish to provide concerning the factors listed 
in 810.10(b)2. 
D. Designation of any information considered proprietary whose public disclosure 
would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the applicant2.  
The DOE- National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), among other 
government agencies, accounts for global technological evolutions that are significant 
challenges to the United States’ Export Control System with various export control tools. 
These tools must simultaneously address nuclear technologies, as well as regulatory 
requirements. Export controls are increasingly augmented with data mining and 
statistical analysis to decrease the load on human analysts. A computer based export 
control program can enhance the ability of the human element by providing insight into 
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the data itself, as well as enable awareness across multiple nonproliferation levels and 
connections. Computational tools can accommodate various forms of technical 
knowledge, including insights and social networks, such that no valuable knowledge is 
missed. Evaluating human export control judgments can provide insight into the 
historical nature of export control violations, trends, and regulatory weaknesses.  
I.B Objective 
 
The objective of this work is to support DOE- NNSA for the following Part 810 
General Authorization data objectives: 
1. Searching: Acquired Part 810 General Authorization data from NNSA will be 
tagged under agreed upon categories with Argonne National Laboratory. These 
categories will ultimately be placed in a central repository to facilitate ad hoc 
searching, wherein new documents will be systematically tagged. Standard 
searches will be determined and implemented.  
2. Reporting: Determine what type of reporting is necessary, for example general 
authorizations to China and, customize as necessary.  
3. Analyzing: Perform ad hoc analyses of Part 810 General Authorization data to 
recognize patterns.  
4. Predicting: Alert and notify 810 officers when a General Authorization report is 
to be expected and identify using news sources when a General Authorization 
report is not received. For example, if a news source, such as World Nuclear 
News, reports that France is building a new research reactor, a General 
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Authorization request is to be expected and in the case one is not received, a red 
flag would be drawn.  
 
In addition to the objectives given above, four questions are to be answered 
regarding the received Part 810 General Authorization Data. They are as follows: 
1. Is there any data or given patterns relative to general authorizations for countries 
that are not designated as Specifically Authorized Destinations? Specifically 
Authorized Destinations [listed in Appendix I] are those countries that the 
Secretary of Energy has deemed eligible to undergo the General Authorization 
Process, as they have non-inimical interests toward the United States.  
2. Is there any data or given patterns, relative to sensitive nuclear technologies, such 
as enrichment or reprocessing [technologies that should not appear in General 
Authorization Data]? 
3. Are there any patterns in technology being sent to a particular country, e.g. same 
or different technologies and technology changes over time? 
4. Are there any patterns exhibited by companies in the United States? Does one 
country always go to the same one or two U.S. companies or do certain 
companies only transfer to certain countries or regions? 
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CHAPTER II  
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are traditionally two theories for proliferation and they include “the 
demand side in which proliferation is driven by the national security demand for the 
weapons” and “the supply side in which proliferation is driven by the ready supply of 
nuclear materials and technology.”3 A sole theory, however, is not sufficient to define 
proliferation and as such there should be interplay between national security motivations 
and the facilitation that access to supplies gives. Numerous statistical methods have been 
used in proliferation research and analyses to create a tool to model this interplay.3 One 
such method is that of agent based modeling (ABM) and Bayesian Networks. Dr. 
Elmore showed that using modular Bayesian ABM Nonproliferation Enterprise (BANE) 
that ABM can successfully model historical cases of proliferation, if agent rules are 
properly defined3. BANE contains an integrated system of AMB and Bayesian methods. 
“ABM is a computational methodology addressing the uniqueness of those facilitating or 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Bayesian inference has been employed in 
fields such as intelligence, where information limits are ever present.”3 Using this 
methodology data was produced that confirms the assertion that there is a balance 
between demand/supply drivers and political/military hindrances3.  
Another common proliferation analysis includes increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards System. 
This includes, but it not limited to, proliferation activities outside a State’s declared 
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facilities. Safeguards to measure activities such as these can be quantified with respect to 
costs and detection probabilities. The problem arises, however, when a facility is 
undeclared. A risk-driven approach to Acquisition Path Analysis comparing declared 
and undeclared facilities can be used as a first step analysis for this purpose.4 The input 
will include quantification of numerous factors, such as costs of attractiveness values for 
specific proliferation activities, meaning how enticing an adversary views a pathway to 
the target of interest. Additional factors include potential safeguards measures and 
detection probabilities for these measures including the undeclared field.4 Given that the 
facility is undeclared, there is a lack of quantification for detection probabilities. To 
overcome this, a general verification error model can be used alongside an analogy 
approach. The analogy approach begins by looking at declared facilities, where non-
detection probabilities are known. By extension, the same non-detection probability is 
assumed for undeclared facilities. Say for example it is known that 𝛽"#$%&'#" = 10	%, 
then for the undeclared facility 𝛽-."#$%&'#" = 10	%.4 This approach, although extremely 
simple, cannot be validated for the assumed non-detection probabilities.4  
The IAEA is a major proponent to nuclear non-proliferation. In addition to that 
mentioned above, they are exploring the potential of open source information in 
supporting acquisition pathway analysis to design IAEA state level approaches.5 IAEA 
safeguards are intended to deter nuclear proliferation and are constantly presented with 
new challenges. The IAEA envisions that the state level concept be “an objective-based 
and information driven approach for designing and implementing state level 
approaches,” whose objective is to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities, detect 
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undeclared production of nuclear materials in declared facilities, and detect diversion of 
declared nuclear material in declared facilities.5 Under the state level approach, “states 
will be differentiated based upon objective State-Specific Factors that influence the 
design, planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. In designing these 
state level approaches the IAEA believes that the acquisition path analysis “will identify 
the plausible routes for acquiring weapons usable material and to assess their safeguards 
significance.”5 To accomplish this, it must determine plausible acquisition paths, 
characterize them and finally prioritize. For completion, the acquisition pathway analysis 
will use open source information. It is important to note that open source is said to be 
any type of non-classified or proprietary information including media sources, 
government and non-governmental reports and analyses, commercial data, satellite 
imagery, and trade data.5 Table 1 illustrates how open source information could be used 
in the acquisition pathway analysis. Note, that CSA stands for complementary 
safeguards agreement and AP represents additional protocol. 
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Table 1. Roles for Open Sources Analysis for Consolidation in a Given State’s Past, 
Present, and Planned Nuclear Fuel Cycle-Related Capabilities and Infrastructure.5 
 
There is a great deal of research that has gone into providing a basis for 
predicting and evaluating future proliferation events. Per Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, the simplest analysis is to understand and learn from past proliferation 
events, which includes, “the different paths that have actually been taken to acquire or 
attempt to acquire special nuclear material.”6 Based on evaluation of historical trends in 
nuclear technology development it can be predicted the length of time it takes to acquire 
a technology, the length of time it takes for production of special nuclear material to 
commence, and the approaches used for acquiring the desired technology.6  
It is important to understand when and how weapons-usable material can be 
acquired. This can be carried out using an acquisition network simulation, wherein all 
the material, facilities, and expertise that are required for obtainment are included and 
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represented by a unique node.7 The resources required to construct or obtain the choice 
node can be determined using historical cases and open source information. The most 
likely pathway that an organization will take can be determined and it considers the 
resources available to the organization. It considers any of the nodes the organization 
may already have access to, to determine which path the organization is most likely to 
find the most attractive.7 
In addition to acquisition of special nuclear material and predicting proliferation 
events, the physical protection systems at a facility should be taken into consideration. It 
is the system in place to prevent and eliminate threats to nuclear materials.8 Analyses 
utilizes the adversary sequence diagram to evaluate threat pathways, while also 
determining the probability that an adversary will be interrupted. In a study conducted at 
Texas A&M University, a hypothetical 5 MW pool-type reactor that utilizes highly 
enriched uranium was assumed.8 The protection layers were as follows: offsite, protected 
area, controlled building, reactor containment, and reactor equipment room. The most 
important aspect is the paths of attack for the insider threat.8 To determine this, the 
detection and delay components of the physical protection system need to be measured 
and are subsequently used to construct the adversary sequence diagram.8 The probability 
that the adversary is interrupted is then determined by the detection probability of each 
detection apparatus along the most vulnerable path to the critical detection point.8 Along 
this path there is a constant probability of neutralization. These methods were applied to 
a sabotage scenario at the aforementioned reactor and yielded results that demonstrated 
the applied methodology to evaluate the vulnerability of a physical protection system are 
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successful for an insider-outsider collusion threat. The probability of interruption 
decreased significantly for insider-outsider collusion cases, which leads to a higher 
security risk.8  
When political or economic measures prove unsuccessful in preventing a country 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, military action could become necessary. Research 
performed at the Naval Postgraduate School, has developed a tool to support strategic 
delay of development of nuclear weapons.9 The optimal interdiction model selects points 
for interdicting the weapons program of the country in question. Selection points are 
chosen such that the induced delay in completing the project is maximized.9 When run, 
“results obtained show that the optimal interdiction activities can be solved with an 
operations research approach. In a few of the multiple activity interdiction runs the 
activities selected for interdiction were not on the original critical path, and thus an 
interdiction induces both a delay and a new critical path. These results show the critical 
path may not be the best source of activities to interdict.”9  
Based on the literature review, even though multiple ways of analyzing 
proliferation data exists, a methodology to systematically analyze Part 810 General 
Authorization has never been attempted, which is the topic of the current study.  
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                                            CHAPTER III  
                                         METHODOLOGY 
III.A Digitization Process 
 
To meet objectives, Part 810 General Authorization Data was collected over 
approximately 25 years and includes 12,931 authorization letters. Optical Character 
Reader (OCR) software transforms General Authorization Data received into a workable 
form, such that various searches can be performed. There are numerous open source 
OCR software available. Three OCR software packages were considered for this project. 
They are as follows: Google Drive OCR, OCRupus, and Tesseract. Google Drive OCR 
works via upload command, however, there are various rules of thumb. Firstly, the file 
should be high resolution with clear contrasts and even lighting. Secondly for optimal 
recognition the text being scanned should be horizontal and read from left to right with 
standard typefaces, such as Helvetica and Times New Roman10. OCRupus is a collection 
of document analysis programs rather than a turnkey OCR system11. At the onset, 
OCRupus used Tesseract as an internal recognition engine, but later developers 
redefined the software to run under their own engine, which was described as innovative, 
but lacking in maturity12. Tesseract is a command line tool and produces arguably the 
most accurate results13. Despite the rules of thumb mentioned above, such as high 
resolution with clear contrasts and even lighting, Google Drive OCR was chosen, as 
several PDF’s were successfully transformed into a workable form, a form in which 
various in-text searches can be carried out. 
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III.B Data Analytics 
 
            Numerous tools were considered for data analysis at the macro level. Macro level 
assessment was chosen over micro level, as micro level would only focus on few parts. 
For example, it would only look at suppliers and technology, while macro level 
incorporates the larger nuclear proliferation picture focusing on all the following14: 
 
A. Suppliers: countries or companies providing technology.  
B. Technology: specific items or commodities, or groupings of items.  
C. Consumers: countries and/or companies interested in acquiring technology.  
D. Economy: the social system focused on production, distribution, and use of 
technology, both dual use and proliferation only. The level of granularity or 
detail can vary from company to country, region, or worldwide based on the 
available data.  
E. Proliferation context: organizational framework describing the entire 
proliferation cycle.  
The first analytical tool considered was a Bayes Net, which portrays a graphical 
representation of relationships among several variables. Mathematically speaking, it is a 
representation of the joint distributions among random variables, with directed and 
acyclic links. For example, Bayes Nets are commonly used to support proliferation 
assessments in determining the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. The 
model accounts for various social factors, such as political, economic, nuclear capability, 
security, and national identity. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has 
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developed a network such as the one described above, wherein information is used from 
both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the 
Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear 
weapons15.  
A Distance Model was the second tool explored for use. A model such as this 
captures the net effect of all factors that make certain ‘transactions’ less likely in each 
setting. These settings represent commercial relationships or potential relations of the 
players in the transactions14. To review the massive amount of data received, a big data 
analytics tool, developed by PNNL was reviewed16. T-Rex is a visual analytics tool that 
allows analysts to explore tabular data sources, to quickly identify patterns. The most 
useful facet of this tool, as it applies to the project at hand, is the timeline view that 
shows temporal patterns in the data16.  
System Dynamics Models (SD) are extremely useful in understanding the 
impacts of policy and individual decisions on the behavior of a system. They represent 
cause and effect relationships; ultimately aiding in the understanding of how the 
decisions of multiple entities interact to produce an overall behavior that would be nearly 
impossible to predict in the absence of the model14. Coupling a SD methodology with 
another modeling approach covers its limitations in areas such as treating coarse data in 
a more granular and precise fashion.  
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Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) encompasses autonomous decision-making 
agents that assess the situation, make decisions and execute the appropriate behavior14. 
Justifications for choosing a coupled SD model are presented below: 
 
I. Advances the understanding of the present export control licensing realm 
including process efficacy.  
II. Helps in the discovery of better licensing protocols through simulations of 
various licensing scenarios. 
III. Improves other methods and tools for nuclear proliferation analysis.  
IV. Enhances the understanding of nuclear proliferation through various scenarios.  
 
The particular ABM and simulation explored, but not used is entitled Repast 
HPC. HPC stands for high performance computing. Repast HPC was developed at 
Argonne National Laboratory. The Repast Symphony toolkit’s principles and concepts 
went into Repast HPC for larger scale simulations. Repast HPC is written in C++ using 
the message passing interface (MPI) for parallel operations, i.e. wherein numerous 
processes are running in parallel and memory is not shared across these processes, while 
also making use of the boost library17. In this case, the agents are implemented as objects 
in C++ classes, while their states are represented by the field variables of the specific 
classes in question and agent behavior by methods in those classes. Repast HPC is 
intended to smooth the path from small-scale simulations to large-scale distributed 
simulations using a Logo-like system18. 
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The agent population in Repast HPC is enveloped in contexts that have 
projections associated with them. A Projection imposes a relational structure on the 
agents in the Context. Repast implements 3 types of projections: A grid, a continuous 
space and a network. For example, a grid projection puts agents into a grid matrix 
structure where each agent is placed in a cell location on the grid. Any agents added to 
the Context become accompanying vertices to the entire network projection17. Thus, a 
SD model coupled with other methods can prove to be a powerful tool, however, the Part 
810 General Authorization data used as part of this research will not be considered under 
the impact of policy. Thus, ABM was solely used.  
 
This research was done in partnership with ANL, as requested by NNSA. Upon 
recommendation, the software tool known as Tableau was used as the primary tool for 
exploring questions posed in the Objective. Tableau is a software commonly used for big 
data analytics in addition to being highly sought after for advanced sorting capabilities. 
It combines a structured query language with a graphic interface descriptive language 
called Visual Query Language (VizQL)19. Tableau will query relational databases, 
cubes, cloud databases, and spreadsheets19. Trend lines can be determined between 
report date and requested patterns of interest if applicable or warranted.  
III.C Data Mining 
Three tools were considered for data mining purposes. Lumify was the first to be 
examined. The program is a web-based open source interface20; it allows the user to 
explore relationships in the user’s data via a suite of analytic options, including 2D and 
3D graph visualizations, full-text faceted search, dynamic histograms, interactive 
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geographic maps, and collaborative workspaces shared in real-time21. Lumify is based 
on five key concepts and they include the following21: 
 
1. Ontology- Structure for organizing information to be analyzed.  
2. Entity- What is to be represented.  
3. Relationship- Link between two entities.  
4. Properties- Data encompassing an entity.  
5. Graph- Relationship between entities.  
 
Orange Data Mining is a component-based software suite that is free of charge. It 
enables one to perform simple data analysis, explore statistical distributions, box plots 
and scatter plots or delve further using decision trees, hierarchical clustering, heat maps, 
MDS and linear projections22. Data mining is carried out through Python scripting with a 
hierarchically organized toolbox of data mining components and visual programming23. 
The component hierarchies are as follows23: 
 
1. Data management and preprocessing 
2. Classification 
3. Regression 
4. Association 
5. Ensembles 
6. Clustering 
7. Evaluation 
8. Projections 
17 
 Ultimately, Maltego was determined to be the most viable option, as the program 
is most rigorous in internet searches. There are three forms of Maltego and they are as 
follows: Classic, XL, and CE. Maltego Classic is the chosen form, as it can identify 
nearly 10,000 sources. The data mining tool produces graphs for link analysis, as well as 
act as an effective tool for finding relationships between information from various 
sources on the Internet. This is carried out under the idea of transforms that automate the 
process of querying different data sources, ultimately displaying results on a node based 
graph for link analysis. The specific transform to be used is the phrase transform, 
wherein a key phrase or part thereof is entered and searched for on various websites. 
Connections are found using open source intelligence techniques by querying sources 
DNS records, whois records, search engines, social networks, various online APIs and 
extracting meta data24.		
III.D Weka Data Mining and the Apriori Algorithm
The agent based modeling software entitled Weka, was used to determine 
association rules for data mining. The program, developed at The University of Waikato 
in New Zealand, is a collection of machine learning algorithms, including Bayes Net and 
Apriori. Weka contains tools for data pre-processing, classification, regression, 
clustering, association rules, and visualization. It is also well-suited for developing new 
machine learning schemes25. 
 The Apriori Algorithm or Association Rule Mining is defined as being a tool that 
will, given a certain number of transactions, find rules or prescribed guides that will 
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predict the occurrence of an item based on the occurrences of other items in the 
itemset26. The algorithm is parallelized and implementable. Important definitions are as 
follows26: 
1. Itemset: Collection of one or more items; Example: {Recipient Country, Specific 
Transfer, Recipient Company}. 
2. Support count (𝜎): Frequency of occurrence of an itemset.  
3. Frequent Itemset: An itemset whose support is greater than or equal to a minsup 
(minimum support) threshold, as denoted by 𝐿2 for the 𝑘45 itemset.  
4. Support (s): Fraction of transactions that contain both X and Y. 
5. Confidence (c): How often items in Y appear in transactions that contain X 
Key concepts of the Apriori principle are given below27: 
1. Any subset of the frequent itemset must be frequent. 
2. A joint operation is the process of determining the minimum support threshold, 
wherein a set of candidate i-itemsets is generated by uniting 𝐿267 with itself.  
The association rule itself is an implication expression in the form of 𝑋 → 𝑌, 
wherein X and Y are itemsets. This expression is similar to that of a chemical equation, 
while it does not indicate X approaching Y.  For example, the following expression and 
itemsets are given: 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 → 	 {𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟}.    
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Number Items 
1 Recipient Country, Report Year, Specific Transfer 
2 Recipient Country, Report Year 
3 Report Year, Recipient Country 
4 Specific Transfer 
Table 2. Items for Example Support and Confidence Calculations. 
 
Support and confidence evaluations are illustrated below for 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 → 	 {𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟}.    
𝑠 = 	𝜎{𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟}𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 = 14 = 0.25 
𝑐 = 𝜎{𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟}𝜎{𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟} = 12 = 0.5 
The Apriori Algorithm within Weka will determine association rules as 
illustrated below.27 Refer to definitions, presented on page 17.  
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Figure 1. Algorithm Steps to Determine Association Rules for Data Mining.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
IV.A Excel Spreadsheet Categorization 
Information obtained from the OCR converted General Authorization Data was 
separated into unified categories in an excel spreadsheet. This database has 12,931 
authorization requests. Proper categorical names were chosen that are universally 
defined and understood. The categorical names can be consistently applied by various 
810 workers who employ and use the Part 810 General Authorization Data. The chosen 
categories are as follows: 
1. File Number 
2. File Name 
3. Report Type  
4. Report Date 
5. Company Submitting the Report  
6. Name of the Individual Submitting the Report 
7. Recipient Company  
8. Name of the Individual at the Recipient Company (if applicable) 
9. Country of Recipient  
10. Type of Transfer E.g. Engineering Services, Engineering Support, Technical 
Information Sharing, and Personnel 
11. Specific Transfer E.g. Medical Isotopes Production System, Eddy Current 
Testing, etc. 
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12. Begin/End Transfer Dates 
13. Foreign National Name, Citizenship and Employment (if applicable) 
14. 10 CFR 810.2 
It is important to note that 10 CFR 810.2 methodology was used to tag 
documents based on Specific Transfer and activity description. Possible tagging 
includes: 
1. Uranium conversion (Conversion of U3O8 to UF6) 
2. Thorium conversion (Conversion of Th232 to U233, addition of F9 gas converts UF4 
to UF6) 
3. Plutonium conversion (Conversion to weapons-grade plutonium, formation of 
PuO2 for MOX fuel)  
4. Neptunium conversion (Formation of NpO2 for MOX fuel) 
5. Fuel Fabrication 
6. Isotopic Separation 
7. Reactors 
8. Production ADS 
9. Heavy Water 
10. Reprocessing 
An excel spreadsheet with the above information acted as the central repository 
to facilitate ad hoc searching, wherein new documents were systematically tagged and 
standard searches were determined and implemented. 
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IV.B Answered Questions Presented to DOE 
As given earlier, the following four questions were answered:  
1. Is there any data or given patterns relative to general authorizations for countries 
that are not designated as specifically authorized destinations? 
2. Is there any data or given patterns relative to sensitive nuclear technologies, such 
as enrichment or reprocessing? 
3. Are there any patterns in technology being sent to a country e.g. same or 
different technologies and technology changes over time? 
4. Are there any patterns exhibited by companies in the United States? Does one 
country always go to the same one or two U.S. companies or do certain 
companies only transfer to certain countries or regions? 
Inquiry one is analyzed as below:  
Non-specifically authorized destinations were found to have general 
authorization requests and are presented in Figure 2 alongside the number of 
accompanying requests. Specifically Authorized Destinations are given in Table 9, 
Appendix I, as they are the participants in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Non-specifically 
authorized destinations should be undergoing the specific authorization process; it is not 
known whether this is checked by the NNSA.  
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Figure 2. Non-Specifically Authorized Destination Requests and Number of Records. 
 
To determine specific transfer trends to these destinations shown in Figure 2, the 
number of records over all countries were counted and summed for employment, 
engineering services, engineering support, personnel use, and technical information 
sharing (Figure 3). Engineering services would include reactor part replacement, 
engineering support encompasses funding, personnel use includes; but is not limited to; 
internships and technical information sharing includes reactor part specifications.  
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Figure 3. Specific Transfers Summed Over All Non-Specifically Authorized Countries.  
 
Most records revolve around technical information sharing. It is important to 
note, however, the spread between the maximum and minimum points. The maximum 
and minimum points for the Number of Requests are approximately 85 and 30; a 
significant difference, indicating that engineering support and personal use are a minor 
desire of non-specifically authorized destinations. Technical information sharing, 
employment, and engineering services, on the contrary, should be closely monitored. 
Moreover, non-specifically authorized countries that exceed a certain threshold of 
general authorizations should be supervised to ensure that these countries of interest are 
not using multiple general authorizations to circumvent specific authorization. To 
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determine trends, the number of authorizations as pertaining to the above specific 
transfers were counted and plotted for non-specially authorized countries. Figure 4 
illustrates the trends for engineering services, while Figures 5, 6, and 7 show engineering 
support, personnel and technical information sharing. All figures were created using 
Tableau and as such there are preset settings that place axis titles in specific locations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of Authorizations for Engineering Services as a Function of Time.  
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There isn’t a specific trend to be identified. The number of authorizations 
plateaus and proceeds to peak in 2000, then decreases in the following years. The 
number of authorizations is dominated by China and Armenia in 2000. Both countries 
have 20 General Authorization Requests. Armenia solely requested information related 
to operational safety, while China only requested specifications for natural gadolinium 
oxide powder.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of Authorizations for Engineering Support as a Function of Time.  
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As illustrated, the number of authorizations pertaining to engineering support 
fluctuate over time and peak in 2012. As with engineering services there is no trend to be 
identified. China and India dominate the number of authorization requests; China has 5, 
while India has 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of Authorizations for Personnel as a Function of Time. 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the number of authorizations for personnel fluctuate for 
non-specifically authorized destinations, peaking in 2005.  
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Figure 7. Number of Authorizations for Technical Information Sharing as a Function of 
Time. 
Authorizations as pertaining to technical information sharing remain steady with 
minor fluctuations. It is unreliable to evaluate trends when there is no statistical analysis; 
one was not performed for this work and as such, trends discussed above should be 
considered with reservations.  
No significant trends for non-specifically authorized destinations as pertaining to 
Technical Information Sharing were identified, while China is the dominant country in 
Engineering Services and Engineering Support. Armenia has a significant number of 
authorization requests in Engineering Services and India has the second most requests in 
Engineering Support. The reason for these spikes depends on what is going on in the 
country at the time of request and thus cannot be fully reconciled.  
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Records pertaining to sensitive nuclear technologies within the obtained Part 810 
General Authorization Data are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Specific Transfers as Pertaining to Enrichment and Reprocessing to Various 
Countries. 
Data in Table 3 indicates enrichment is the dominant sensitive nuclear 
technology transfer. It should be noted that all countries receiving these sensitive nuclear 
technology transfers are considered generally authorized destinations, except for China; 
the specific transfer was not disclosed in the report. It is recommended that non-
specifically authorized destinations should undergo the specific authorization process 
for sensitive nuclear technology transfers, as countries that are not considered 
specifically authorized destinations could potentially have inimical interests towards the 
United States.  
To restate, Question 3 asked the following: Are there any patterns in technology 
being sent to a country e.g. same or different technologies and technology changes over 
time? China and Argentina were two countries used to explore if there are any patterns 
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in technology being sent overtime. Records were isolated from the Part 810 Excel 
Spreadsheet and imported into Tableau. 
 
 
Table 4. Tableau Pictorial Representing the Specific Transfer, as Given by 10CFR810.2 
and Report Date for China. 
 
Technology transfers to China, shown in Table 4, follow a pattern for the start-up 
to decommissioning of a standard nuclear power plant. No specific plant was chosen for 
reference. The first transfer was a construction & startup audit comparison represented 
by the Reactors tag under 10 CFR 810.2. Subsequent authorization requests build on the 
first transfer explained above. For example, transfers related to nuclear waste and reactor 
safety followed the audit request. Enrichment requests were the last to be observed in 
2006. In August 2006, technical information was transferred regarding enrichment; a 
Chinese delegation visited a U.S. gaseous diffusion plant. This does not mean, however, 
that any specifications of the gaseous diffusion technology were disclosed. The Plant 
produced low-enriched uranium, originally as feedstock for military reactors and 
weapons refining and later for nuclear power fuel; no highly-enriched uranium was 
produced at this site. The plant has since ceased operations.  
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Table 5. Tableau Pictorial Representing the Specific Transfer, as Given by 10CFR810.2 
and Report Date for Argentina. 
  
Argentinian technology transfers revolve around reactor parts and fuel. There are 
no alarming changes over time, rather there are no transfers related to sensitive nuclear 
technologies. There are no authorization records prior to 1995, because during the 1960s 
to the early 1990s Argentina pursued an ambitious program of nuclear energy and 
technological development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium 
enrichment facility28.  
 
Question 4 asks, are there any patterns exhibited by companies in the United 
States? Does one country always go to the same one or two U.S. companies or do certain 
companies only transfer to certain countries or regions? Companies with greater than 
fifteen general authorization transfers were imported into Tableau for more accurate 
visual analysis, wherein recipient company recurrence was counted. It is important to 
note that for sensitivity purposes, companies are denoted as U.S. Company 1, U.S. 
Company 2, etc., while Foreign companies are denoted as Foreign Company 1, Foreign 
Company 2, etc. There are instances where information is transferred within house to 
other country subsidiaries, such as U.S. Company 1 (Figure 8), U.S. Company 2 (Figure 
9), and U.S. Company 3 (Figure 10).  
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Figure 8. U.S. Company 1 Transfer Recurrence to Various U.S. and Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
  34 
 
Figure 9. U.S. Company 2 Transfer Recurrence to Various U.S. and Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
 
 
Figure 10. U.S. Company 3 Transfer Recurrence to Various Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
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Few companies were identified as consistently going to one or two of the same 
foreign entities. For example, U.S. Company 4 was found to only provide engineering 
services and supplies to a South Korean company, with twenty-two general authorization 
requests. Given company isolation, specific transfers were explored to ensure non-
inimical intentions and are given in Table 6 below.    
 
 
Table 6. Specific Transfer and Transfer Date to a South Korean Company from U.S. 
Company 4. 
 
The above table shows no alarming transfers; there is no sensitive nuclear 
technology, nor dual use items. All requests were made in 2015 and included non-
inimical transfers, such as radiation protection designs, reviews, and consulting services.  
As shown in Figure 11, U.S. Company 5 has significant transfers to a Canadian 
company. Company recurrence is counted over all years contained within the Part 810 
General Authorization Data (1981-2015). Given Canada is a generally authorized 
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destination and both are power generating stations it is expected that technical 
information be shared.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. U.S. Company 5 Transfer Recurrence to Various Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
U.S. Company 6 and a Swiss company have been identified as having a 
significant amount of technology transfers, as shown in Figure 12. Company recurrence 
is once again counted over all years contained within the Part 810 General Authorization 
Data (1981-2015). It can’t be said with confidence why there are increased transfers 
between these two companies, as political relationships and turmoil are not known, nor 
considered as a variable.   
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Figure 12. U.S. Company 6 Transfer Recurrence to Various Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
This partnership was further explored by identifying specific transfers. 
Table 7. Specific Transfers Between U.S. Company 6 and a Swiss Company. 
All transfers shown pertain to safety and training. Additionally, Switzerland is a 
generally authorized country, thus the association is favorable.  
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U.S. Company 7 favors a U.S. power company, as given in Figure 13. The 
difference between the minimum and maximum recurrence points is only eight. 
Company 7 only provided a U.S. power company with engineering services for their 
reactor design.  
Figure 13. U.S. Company 7 Transfer Recurrence to Various U.S. and Foreign 
Companies. Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity 
purposes. 
U.S. Company 8 provided significant services to a U.S. company as illustrated in 
Figure 14. Engineering services were carried out within the United States. No technical 
information was shared.  
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Figure 14. U.S. Company 8 Transfer Recurrence to Various U.S. and Foreign 
Companies. Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity 
purposes. 
U.S. Company 9, based out of Oregon, has transferred a significant amount of 
information to a Swedish company. U.S. Company 9’s general authorizations are shown 
in Figure 15. As in many other cases Sweden is on the general authorization list. 
Moreover, material sent was either hafnium rods or zircaloy-4 channel strip, essential 
reactor materials.  
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Figure 15. U.S. Company 9 Transfer Recurrence to Various Foreign Companies. 
Note: Companies are denoted as Company 1, 2, etc. for sensitivity purposes. 
 
No one country always goes to the same U.S. company; there is a significantly 
broad spectrum. Certain U.S. companies, on the contrary, do as exhibited in Figures 11-
15. Table 8 summarizes part of Question 4, which asks: Do certain companies only 
transfer to certain countries or regions? Of utmost importance, as stated previously in 
this section, all recipient countries given are generally authorized destinations, including 
transfers within the United States. 
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U.S. Company Recipient Country 
U.S. Company 4 Korea 
U.S. Company 5 Canada 
U.S. Company 6 Switzerland 
U.S. Company 7 United States 
U.S. Company 8 United States 
U.S. Company 9 Sweden 
Table 8. U.S. Companies that Favor One Recipient Country.  
 
 
Figure 16. U.S. Company 5 Transfer Recurrence to Specific Foreign Countries. 
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Figure 17. U.S. Company 6 Transfer Recurrence to Specific Foreign Countries. 
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Figure 18. U.S. Company 7 Transfer Recurrence to Specific Foreign Countries. 
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Figure 19. U.S. Company 8 Transfer Recurrence to Specific Foreign Countries. 
 
  45 
 
Figure 20. U.S. Company 9 Transfer Recurrence to Specific Foreign Countries. 
 
 
 To reiterate, Figures 16-20 indicate that certain U.S. companies do favor specific 
countries. These countries, however, are Specifically Authorized Destinations and thus 
are favorable. 
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IV. C Prediction: Number of Authorizations to be Received Per Year 
 
Prediction was carried out using Tableau’s software package entitled Forecast. 
Attempts were made to predict how many authorization requests would be received for a 
given year. Results obtained using this program were also supplemented by simple Excel 
modeling. Few cases were successfully run, as Tableau’s Forecast option is only 
successful with minimal gaps. The Part 810 General Authorization Data contained gaps 
or minimal records i.e. a record count below 60 for the following years: 1983-1986, 
1989-1994, 1997, 2006, and 2008. Although excel modeling proved lucrative, it does not 
carry any argumentative weight, as variables, such as market conditions were not 
considered. A country’s specific needs were not known. The excel modeling is only 
given as an extremely vague estimate.   
 Data obtained for Slovenia was used as a test case. It is important to note that in 
Figure 21, the shaded region and line contained therein are the forecast or prediction for 
years to come. Figure 21 was contrived using Tableau. The spike in 2015 was a result of 
increased funding, as categorized under Engineering Support. 
  47 
 
Figure 21. Slovenia Forecast as Given by Tableau.  
 
As shown, the program predicts that for coming years the likely number of 
reports to be received is approximately 41, but it can range between 0 and 75; an 
extremely large spread. Data was subsequently plotted in excel using a simple linear 
regression and exponential fit. It is important to note that rather than using the Report 
Years themselves, a number equivalent was assigned to each. For example, year 2006 
corresponds to 1, while 2007 corresponds to 2.  
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Figure 22. Linear Fit of the Number of Received Authorizations as a Function of Report 
Year for Slovenia. 
 
 
Figure 23. Exponential Fit of the Number of Received Authorizations as a Function of 
Report Year for Slovenia.  
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The R2 value is known as the coefficient of determination. This value is 
interpreted as the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is predictable 
from the independent variable29. The value of the coefficient of determination as 1 
indicates the dependent variable can be predicted without error from the independent 
variable29. The R2 value for the linear and exponential fits are 0.53 and 0.85 respectively. 
Equations given in Figures 22 and 23 were used to predict the number of 
authorizations to be received in 2019, to compare against Tableau’s forecast. The 
number of authorizations, as determined by the linear fit are 50, while the exponential fit 
yields 66 authorizations. Output of the linear fit falls within Tableau’s forecast. Percent 
error between the linear fit result and Tableau’s predicted 41 authorizations was 
determined by Equation 1 and is found to be 22 %, while error in the exponential 
prediction is 66 %.  
   %	error = YZ[Y\]^Y_`ab6`cYd\Y`]eab`cYd\Y`]eab 	(Equation	1)30
Analysis was carried out for Argentina, however, given excel modeling 
uncertainty, it is not included.  
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Figure 24. Argentinian Forecast as given by Tableau. 
Tableau predicts the number of authorizations to be received ranges between 1 
and 7 from 2016 to 2018, while the predicted records for 2019 and 2020 are between 0 
and 8. Contained within the range, is the horizontal line, representing the specific 
number of predicted authorizations to be received (4 authorizations).  
Tableau’s forecast can be used as an estimate to predict when a general 
authorization is to be received given a year. Excel modeling, on the contrary, should be 
used sparingly, as unknown variables, such as country needs, are not taken into 
consideration.   
IV.D News Sources
Maltego Classic Edition (CE) was the primary tool used for predicting when a 
General Authorization is to be expected. The program was set up such that it will search 
for a specific country and tag as given in Excel Spreadsheet Categorization. Countries to 
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be explored include those destined as generally authorized and participants in The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as given in Appendix I. U.S. Companies identified in 
Answered Questions to be Presented to DOE were also examined. An example phrase 
search would be “Argentina” “Uranium Conversion”, while U.S. companies were 
searched for on an individual basis. It is important to note that all keywords used for 
tagging cannot be searched for at the same time, as then each phrase will need to be 
found in the same source.  
Upon entering the phrase of choice, Maltego CE will generate a graph showing 
link analysis between all phrases, in addition to a report that will give URL links, as 
well as snippets from the source of interest. It is up to the discretion of the user to 
determine which sources are viable and useful. Example nodular graphs for Slovenia 
and Australia are given in Figures 25 and 26, while report fragments are shown in 
Figures 27 and 28, as reports can span 60+ pages. It is important to note that the code 
searches all sources; there is no reason Wikipedia sources are only given.  
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Figure 25. Example Nodular Graph Generated using Maltego CE for Slovenia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  53 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Example Nodular Graph Generated using Maltego CE for Australia. 
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Figure 27. Example Fragment from the Slovenia Report.  
 
  55 
 
Figure 28. Example Fragment from the Australia Report.  
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IV.E Data Mining and Patterns 
 
The Apriori Algorithm was used for data mining purposes in addition to 
identifying patterns that in turn resulted in association mining rules. Sample output is 
given in Figure 29 and explained upon below.  
 
Figure 29. Sample Apriori Output for Argentina.  
Note: The company name is blacked out for sensitivity purposes. 
 
Apriori, as used via Weka, was set up such that it would find association rules for 
data mining using categories in the constructed Excel Spreadsheet. The chosen variables 
were Report Year, Type of Transfer, 10 CFR 810.2, Company, and Recipient. It is 
important to note that these variables are not numeric, but rather categorical. For this 
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reason, the Report Year is presented in roman numerals, rather than given as a discrete 
number.  
The run information, as given above, will present the following: 
• Scheme for Learning Association used: Apriori
• Relation Name: Argentina
• Number of Instances in the Relation: 22
• Number of Attributes in the Relation: 5
The program initiates by generating the sets of large itemsets found for each 
support size that is considered. For example, in the case above, 10 itemsets were found 
to have the required minimum support, as given by Size of set of large itemsets L(1):10. 
Apriori, by default, will produce 10 rules. It will begin with a minimum support of 100 
% of the data items and subsequently decrease in 5% increments until there are a 
minimum of ten rules with required confidence. Minimum confidence is 0.4 or 40 %; 
minimum support decreased to 0.25 or 25 % before the required number of rules were 
generated. Rule generation required 15 cycles. Best rules found are given at the end of 
the run information. The number that proceeds ==> is indicative of the number of items 
covered by the premise. The numeric following, gives the number of those items for 
which the rule’s consequent holds31. For example, take the first rule given in Figure 29; 
If the Type of Transfer is technical information sharing, it can be said with 100 % 
confidence that the likely recipient will be a specific Argentinian company. Rules such 
as these, can be applied to how data is mined, as well as predicting what could be seen in 
the future. Apriori was applied to all countries in the NSG. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Data objectives were carried out and completed in conjunction with ANL. The 
constructed Excel spreadsheet enables ad hoc searching, while the analytic software 
Tableau was used to answer questions to be presented to the DOE. No significant trends 
for non-specifically authorized destinations as pertaining to Technical Information 
Sharing were identified, while China is the dominant country in Engineering Services 
and Engineering Support. Armenia has a significant number of authorization requests in 
Engineering Services and India has the second most requests in Engineering Support. 
The reason for these spikes depends on what is going on in the country at the time of 
request and thus cannot be fully reconciled. Additionally, the data package can be used 
to determine what type of reporting is necessary and customize accordingly. For 
example, as previously stated, non-specifically authorized countries that exceed a certain 
threshold of general authorizations should be supervised to ensure that these countries of 
interest are not using multiple general authorizations to circumvent specific 
authorization. The Apriori algorithm was implemented to recognize patterns and 
establish association rules, such that patterns and ad hoc searching can be modified 
accordingly. Apriori was run for all countries in the NSG. Apriori could also be used for 
prediction. For example, if given the Type of Transfer it can be predicted with a certain 
confidence that one given company is the likely recipient. Tableau’s interim program, 
Forecast, has been used in conjunction with Excel modeling to predict when a General 
Authorization is to be expected. Tableau’s forecast can be used as an estimate to predict 
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when a general authorization is to be received given a year. Excel modeling, on the 
contrary, should be used sparingly, as unknown variables, such as country needs, are not 
taken into consideration. Maltego CE was the primary tool used for predicting when a 
General Authorization is to be expected. The program was set up such that it will search 
for a specific country and tag as given in Excel Spreadsheet Categorization. Upon 
entering the phrase of choice, Maltego CE will generate a graph showing link analysis 
between all phrases, in addition to a report that will give URL links, as well as snippets 
from the source of interest. It is up to the discretion of the user to determine which 
sources are useful. The tools created and utilized above have been tested and prove to be 
a reliable method for monitoring and analyzing the Part 810 General Authorization Data.  
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